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Strategic Retreat: A Proposed Response to Evasive 
Energy Company Tactics Following the Shale Boom-
and-Bust 
I. INTRODUCTION: UNIQUE MARKET CONDITIONS AND 
QUESTIONABLE PRACTICES 
In 2006, there were enormous doubts about the viability of the 
United States’ natural gas industry and its ability to adequately 
supply domestic demand.1 However, new technologies and 
discoveries resulted in a boom in the natural gas industry.2 Across 
the country, natural gas companies like Chesapeake Energy 
Corporation discovered deep formations of natural gas, called 
shale.3 Large, state-spanning formations were discovered in 
Arkansas, Texas, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, and the Appalachian 
Basin.4 In Louisiana, a massive formation, the Haynesville Shale, 
was discovered in the northwest portion of the state.5 Preliminary 
estimates show that the Haynesville Shale may contain the 
equivalent of “33 billion barrels of oil, or 18 years’ worth of current 
U.S. oil production,” which had some members of the natural gas 
industry claiming, “There’s no dry hole.”6 
Chesapeake drilled its first exploratory well in the Haynesville 
Shale by March 2006.7 When prices for natural gas were 
skyrocketing, Chesapeake went public with its discovery of the 
Haynesville Shale in 2008.8 Based on high prices, natural gas 
companies began a “land-grab” that resulted in the execution of high 
value leases.9 These companies offered highly favorable terms, 
including extremely lucrative sign-up bonuses.10 However, an 
unsettled economy soon eroded demand for natural gas. 
                                                                                                             
  Copyright 2014, by SAMUEL S. CRICHTON. 
 1. Ben Casselman, U.S. Gas Fields Go From Bust to Boom, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 30, 2009, at A1. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.; see also Ross H. Pifer, What a Short, Strange Trip It’s Been: Moving 
Forward After Five Years of Marcellus Shale Development, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 
615, 621 (2011). 
 5. Casselman, supra note 1. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Margaret Cronin Fisk, Chesapeake Loses Bid to Void Texas Oil, Gas Rights 
Award, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Sept. 12, 2012), http://www.businessweek. 
com/news/2012-09-12/chesapeake-loses-bid-to-void-texas-oil-gas-rights-award#p1  
[http://perma.cc/N722-L9S4] (archived March 3, 2014). 
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Overproduction resulted in a “glut” that drove natural gas prices to 
their lowest levels in six years and prompted companies to 
significantly decrease drilling.11 Prices plummeted, and “[b]etween 
July and October, oil and natural gas prices fell by more than 50%, 
and kept falling.”12 
Today, natural gas companies still face great difficulty in their 
capacity to successfully and economically withdraw gas from deep-
shale formations. Some officials of the Energy Information Agency 
are concerned that companies could be “set up for failure” and will 
go bankrupt due to the unsustainably high prices that some paid to 
landowners during the “land rush.”13 
Companies such as Chesapeake are still litigating many of the 
leases, or alleged leases, in states across the country. Many 
landowners claim that Chesapeake formed agreements only to “walk 
away” when the market crashed.14 To complicate matters, there is 
significant tension between the decisions emerging in state and 
federal courts in Louisiana and across the country. This tension 
stems from questions as to the landowners’ possible remedies that 
may be available under various causes of action, and in many cases, 
whether there was even a contract at all.15 Even the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has weighed in and, applying Texas 
law, held that an energy company’s promises and actions constituted 
a viable basis for the formation of a contract.16 
                                                                                                             
 11. Casselman, supra note 1. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Ian Urbina, Behind Veneer, Doubt on Future of Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 27, 2011, at A1. 
 14. Fisk, supra note 10. 
 15. In Louisiana, see Ballard v. XTO Energy, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 635, 636 
(W.D. La. 2011); ASJ Interests v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, No. 11-CV-1343, 
2012 WL 2357313 (W.D. La. June 20, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-30717, 2013 WL 
5977608 (5th Cir. June 20, 2012); Haire v. XTO Energy Inc., No. 09-1214, 2009 
WL 4927875 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2009). For other jurisdictions, see Valentino v. 
Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 09-1615, 2010 WL 2034550 (W.D. Pa. May 
21, 2010); Hollingsworth v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:09CV838, 2009 
WL 3601586 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009). 
 16. Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311, 322 (5th Cir. 2012) 
(“Chesapeake claims the agreement lacked terms that would have been included in 
the final Purchase and Sale Agreement, such as warranties of title, depth 
limitations, non-compete provisions, and options to purchase additional acreage. 
The July Agreement, however, did contain depth provisions. Furthermore, 
Chesapeake identifies no authority for its claim that warranties of title, non-
compete provisions and options to purchase additional acreage are essential 
elements in a conveyance of oil and gas leases, rather than terms that the parties 
could leave open for later negotiation. The July Agreement was sufficiently 
definite to be enforced.”). 
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Legislation has been considered, but not yet enacted, in an 
attempt to curb the source of this litigation by stemming the tide of 
unsolicited offers.17 Whether this legislation will be successful is 
subject to debate, and its application, if passed, will be in the hands 
of the courts. Regardless, litigation is pending, and this problem will 
almost certainly arise again when market forces incentivize another 
Louisiana “land-grab.” Well-developed jurisprudence would ensure 
legal predictability for both the energy companies and landowners. 
Across the country, as a result of the shale “land-grab,” three 
general groups of landowners emerged. First, there were landowners 
with viable contracts who were satisfied with the payment they 
received during the “land-grab.” Accordingly, this group is not in 
search of any remedy. Second, there were landowners who did not 
know about the shale formation under their land and signed or 
renewed leases without that knowledge. Third, there were 
landowners who believed they had successfully entered into 
contracts with favorable terms but were later told by company 
officials that no such agreements existed. 
Section II of this Comment discusses the causes of action that 
were sought by the second group of landowners: those who did not 
know about the mineral deposits but had contracts. Section III 
examines the causes of action pursued by the third set of 
landowners, who believed in, and relied on, the confidence of their 
lucrative contracts. Section IV considers the impact of this litigation 
and potential routes that remedies might take in the future. 
II. RESCINDING CONTRACTS UNDER PRE-SHALE  
DISCOVERY FRAUD CLAIMS  
The second group of landowners consists of those who did not 
know about the shale formation under their land, yet signed or 
renewed leases. As a result of their lack of knowledge, they typically 
granted lease terms favorable to energy companies (compared to 
other contracts at the time). These landowners have brought suit and 
have attempted to rescind these newly signed or renewed leases. 
Landowners claim that energy companies had prior knowledge of 
the formations, but failed to make that information available to the 
landowners.18 Further, they argue that this lack of information 
                                                                                                             
 17. S.B. 530, 2012 Reg. Sess. (La. 2012). 
 18. In Louisiana, see HMB Interests, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Louisiana L.P., 
No. 08-1542, 2010 WL 3896521 (W.D. La. Sept. 29, 2010); Hayes v. Pride Oil & 
Gas Props., Inc., No. 09-0488, 2010 WL 318273 (W.D. La. Jan. 22, 2010); 
Thomas v. Pride Oil & Gas Props., Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 238, 245 (W.D. La. 
2009); Cascio v. Twin Cities Dev., LLC, 48 So. 3d 341 (La. Ct. App. 2010). In 
other jurisdictions, see Pifer, supra note 4 (“In an attempt to take advantage of the 
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created a sufficient error to justify rescission of their previous 
agreements. However, these claims have been unsuccessful in both 
federal and state court.19 
The crux of these claims, particularly in Louisiana, is that error 
existed on the part of the landowners as to the object of the mineral 
lease.20 As a result of this supposed error, landowners claim that 
their consent was vitiated.21 The plaintiff-landowners maintain that 
they would never have entered into or renewed their contracts with 
the energy companies had they known the value of the mineral 
deposits under their land.22 They contend that this lack of 
knowledge, particularly when the company knew of the existence of 
the formations, constituted error that would vitiate consent under 
Louisiana Civil Code articles 1948, 1949, and 1950.23 
However, these claims did not survive motions to dismiss in the 
early stages of litigation because of “[t]he inherent nature and 
character of the right to extract oil and gas from the soil . . . [which 
is not] susceptible of having an intrinsic, determinable, and fixable 
value.”24 The courts, when examining this claim, have analyzed the 
nature of the energy business, which is inherently speculative and 
unpredictable.25 Further, they examined comparable laws pertaining 
                                                                                                             
 
higher lease market, many of these landowners with early leases filed legal actions 
seeking to terminate their leases. In total, there were nearly one hundred lawsuits 
filed in state and federal courts, putting the validity of thousands of leases at 
issue.”). 
 19. Id. 
 20. HMB Interests, 2010 WL 3896521; Hayes, 2010 WL 318273 (W.D. La. 
Jan. 22, 2010); Thomas, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 245; Cascio, 48 So. 3d 341. 
 21. See Cascio, 48 So. 3d at 343; see also HMB Interests, 2010 WL 3896521, 
at *1. 
 22. See HMB Interests, 2010 WL 3896521, at *3. 
 23. See Cascio, 48 So. 3d at 343; see also HMB Interests, 2010 WL 3896521, 
at *2 (“The consent of a contracting party may be vitiated by error, fraud, or 
duress . . . . ‘[E]rror vitiates consent only when it concerns a cause without which 
the obligation would not have been incurred and that cause was known or should 
have been known to the other party.’ La. Civ. Code art. 1949. An ‘error concerns 
cause’ when it ‘bears on the nature of the contract, or the thing that is the 
contractual object or a substantial quality of that thing, or the person, or the 
qualities of the other party, of the law, or any other circumstance that the parties 
regarded, or should have regarded, as a cause of the obligation.’ La. Civ. Code art. 
1950.”). 
 24. Cascio, 48 So. 3d at 343 (citing Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607, 609 (La. 
1924)). 
 25. See Thomas, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 244. 
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to mineral rights, which served as further verification of their 
analysis.26 Louisiana courts have consistently dismissed these suits. 
A. Fraudulent Inducement Claims: Another Possible Remedy? 
Plaintiff-landowners brought more viable claims of fraudulent 
inducement under Louisiana Civil Code article 1953, with the 
premise that the companies sought leases but did not disclose the 
very lucrative shale discovery; further, landowners argued that their 
consent was vitiated because energy companies suppressed the truth 
in order to “obtain an unjust advantage” in the form of less 
expensive leases.27 These claims are superior because of the nature 
of the “land-grab” and the energy companies’ prior knowledge of 
the shale formations, which the companies did not bring to the 
public’s attention until after first signing or renewing leases for 
cheaper rates.28 
Louisiana Civil Code article 1953 states that “[f]raud is a 
misrepresentation or a suppression of the truth made with the 
intention either to obtain an unjust advantage for one party or to 
cause a loss or inconvenience to the other. Fraud may also result 
from silence or inaction.”29 There are three basic elements to prove 
fraudulent inducement under article 1953: “(1) a misrepresentation, 
suppression, or omission of true information; (2) the intent to obtain 
an unjust advantage or to cause damage or inconvenience to another; 
and (3) the error induced by a fraudulent act must relate to a 
circumstance substantially influencing the victim’s consent to (a 
cause of) the contract.”30 
The first question for courts is whether energy companies 
misrepresented information when entering into negotiations with 
landowners. The plaintiff may be able to win on this element in 
some instances. For example, Chesapeake’s knowledge of the 
Haynesville Shale was noted in 2006, and they were aware of its 
viability and vast potential for profit in 2007.31 Chesapeake 
                                                                                                             
 26. Cascio, 48 So. 3d at 344 (“Because sales of mineral leases are not subject 
to rescission on this basis under La. R.S. 31:17, it follows that a claim of error on 
this basis cannot rescind the sale either. . . . [W]e find this contract may not be 
rescinded for error.”).  
 27. In Louisiana, see Thomas, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 240. In other jurisdictions, 
see Pifer, supra note 4, at 629. 
 28. Casselman, supra note 1. 
 29. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1953 (2014). 
 30. Williams v. Interstate Dodge Inc., 34 So. 3d 1151, 1155–56 (La. Ct. App. 
2010). 
 31. Casselman, supra note 1.  
342 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. 2 
 
 
 
executives were so confident that they even claimed that “we knew 
that we had a tiger by the tail.”32 
The second element that the plaintiffs need to prove is that the 
companies intended to obtain an unjust advantage. This element 
may also be quite easy for the plaintiffs to contend. While 
companies did not want to announce the discovery of an unproven 
and inaccessible source of natural gas, they also wanted to receive 
favorable terms for tracts of land that were up for renewal or 
suspected of containing lucrative shale deposits.33 It is fathomable 
that energy companies did not disclose the Haynesville Shale’s 
existence in order to not alert competitors and to get a head start in 
the “land-grab.” 
The third and final element is whether the error induced by the 
companies influenced the decision of the landowners to sign the 
lease. The landowners’ argument here may be compelling; in short, 
they claim that they would not have signed the lease on the terms 
offered had they known of the massive shale formation under their 
land. 
B. Courts Reject Un-nuanced Fraud Claims 
Despite the appearance of an adequate fraudulent inducement 
cause of action, Louisiana courts have rejected these claims because 
of both the specific nature of the Louisiana Mineral Code and 
because of holdings in previous Louisiana court decisions. 
Primarily, these claims fall flat under the initial element. Louisiana 
courts have recognized that no duty existed because “a mineral 
lessee is not under a fiduciary obligation to his lessor . . . .”34 To 
sustain a claim under article 1953 that there was “fraud from silence 
or suppression of the truth, there must exist a duty to speak or 
disclose information.”35 Specifically, some courts have rebutted the 
argument that energy companies knew of and concealed the 
existence of the Haynesville Shale by stating that, even if true, the 
plaintiff had not “reposed confidence in Defendant which resulted in 
Defendant’s superiority and influence over Plaintiff;”36 this is 
necessary to show the existence of a fiduciary duty.37 Finally, the 
negotiation process did not impose a duty on the energy company or 
                                                                                                             
 32. Id. 
 33. Casselman, supra note 1. (“We knew we had the tiger by the tail”). 
 34. LA. MIN. CODE art. 122 (2000). 
 35. Thomas v. Pride Oil & Gas Props., Inc., 633 F. Supp. 2d 238, 241 (W.D. 
La. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Greene v. Gulf Coast Bank, 
593 So. 2d 630, 632 (La. 1992)). 
 36. Thomas, 633 F. Supp. 2d at 241. 
 37. Id. 
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its agents because “an invitation to contract, without more, is 
insufficient to establish a fiduciary relationship or a duty to disclose 
information concerning the value of the property.”38 
C. Finding a Remedy by Showing Depth of Relationship to the 
Lessee or Misleading Sstatements. 
If the plaintiff could show that there was more depth to their 
landowner-lessee relationship, such as a history of a business 
relationship with a confidential element to it, then the plaintiff’s 
action might survive a motion for summary judgment.39 In Emerson 
v. Shirley, a mineral royalty owner, Emerson, sought to annul the 
sale of his royalty to a former business partner, Noble, who 
allegedly procured the royalty through a third party, Shirley.40 
Emerson believed that Noble and Shirley had particular inside 
knowledge that the royalty was substantially more valuable than the 
sale price.41 Further, he claimed that, given the informal, oral 
business arrangement that he and Noble previously had, Noble had a 
fiduciary duty and thus was obligated to disclose the profitability of 
the royalty.42 
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that both the trial and 
appellate court were incorrect in facially preventing Emerson’s 
fraud claim, and that Emerson could attempt to establish that his 
relationship with Noble had a confidential element.43 This 
confidential element, if proven, would impose a duty on Noble for 
broader disclosure.44 Joint ownership of a royalty interest alone does 
not create a foundation for a confidential relationship, which might 
entitle one of the parties to disclose the value of a royalty to the 
other.45 
Further, if the plaintiff could show that the misleading disclosure 
was made about a property, then a remedy might be found. In 
American Guaranty Co. v. Sunset Realty & Planting Co., an agent 
for an energy company made representations to an out-of-state 
company regarding tracts of land and the mineral values of each.46 
                                                                                                             
 38. Id. 
 39. See Emerson v. Shirley, 175 So. 909, 911–12 (La. 1937). 
 40. Id. at 910. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. at 911. 
 43. Id.  
 44. Id. at 911–12. 
 45. Id. at 911; see also Mims v. Hilliard, 125 So. 2d 205, 206–07 (La. Ct. 
App. 1960). 
 46. Am. Guar. Co. v. Sunset Realty & Planting Co., 23 So. 2d 409, 412 (La. 
1944). 
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The land, which turned out to be a viable and high-producing field, 
was sold to the defendant, Small, for substantially less than its true 
worth.47 Plaintiff contended that Small made affirmative 
representations that his pursuit of the field was purely speculative48 
when, in fact, he possessed knowledge that the energy company had 
a geophysical map of the area that showed connections to an oil 
producing field of tremendous value.49 Plaintiffs argued that Small 
suppressed this knowledge in order to obtain the property rights at a 
relatively insignificant value.50 
The Louisiana Supreme Court ruled that, while parties are not 
generally bound to make statements regarding the value of the 
subject (such as the potential value of the land), if they make 
statements, then they are obligated to disclose fully.51 The court held 
as follows: 
While a purchaser is under no obligation to inform a 
prospective vendor as to the value, the title or the condition 
of the property involved, he, individually, or as agent for his 
principal, having made representations and statements as to 
the value, the title or the condition of the property, knowing 
them to be false or reckless or without knowledge of their 
truth or falsity, is under the solemn obligation to make 
correct representations and tell the whole truth, without 
concealment or suppression of any material facts, especially 
if there exists an inequality of knowledge, as where the seller 
does not reside near the land and the purchaser does and is 
familiar with it.52 
This is true despite the invitation to investigate by the defendant, 
Small. The invitation does not provide a carte blanche excuse for 
the defendant’s actions.53 In particular, this is significant because the 
Louisiana Supreme Court notes that it was not possible for the out-
of-state plaintiff to ascertain the value of the property; an expert 
would have been required, and investigation would have been 
difficult.54 That invitation to investigate, in conjunction with false 
representations by Small, made the fraud in American Guaranty 
more insidious.55 
                                                                                                             
 47. Id. at 427. 
 48. Id. at 456. 
 49. Id. at 427. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See id. at 449. 
 52. Am. Guar. Co., 23 So. 2d at 449. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 450. 
 55. Id. at 452. 
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In the present sets of cases under consideration, landowners’ 
ignorance of the existence of shale gas stems from the desire of 
many energy companies to maintain confidentiality in the early 
investigation of the shale,56 which is slightly suspect because by 
2007, energy companies earnestly believed that their position was 
not speculative.57 However, whether there was any disclosure that 
might have misled the defendants is a fact-specific issue for the trial 
court to discover. In American Guaranty, Small’s affirmative 
representations regarding the land led the Louisiana Supreme Court 
to conclude that Small had fraudulently induced the plaintiffs to 
convey their mineral rights for substantially lower values. While no 
duty originally existed, once Small made those affirmative 
representations regarding the property, he assumed a duty to fully 
and honestly correct his inaccurate representations and disclose the 
whole truth.58 
A case rendered by the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal 
has also taken an interesting position that may offer a final refuge 
for landowners who seek recourse for alleged fraudulent 
inducement. In Mims v. Hilliard, plaintiffs sought cancellation of a 
mineral lease on the basis that the contract was the product of fraud 
and misrepresentation.59 The defendant and the plaintiff conducted 
negotiations over a fifty-acre tract of land.60 Plaintiffs agreed to 
lease the tract but then discovered that fourteen acres of the fifty-
acre tract were placed in a compulsory unit.61 The defendant was 
aware of the Conservation Commissioner’s actions and of the 
intention to place part of the tract in a new unit62, but the defendant 
used that position for his benefit. However, the appellate court 
pointed out that, had the landowners simply inquired through public 
records, they would have discovered that the Office of Conservation 
formed the new unit.63 While the lack of a confidential relationship 
between the parties made it clear that there was no affirmative duty 
to disclose the information, the defendant would have been under an 
obligation to disclose this material fact to the landowner if he was 
                                                                                                             
 56. Energy company secrecy could be justified from a policy or practical 
standpoint. From a policy standpoint, requiring automatic full disclosure to 
landowners would eliminate a significant market advantage for the company and 
would not reward innovative “first-movers.” From a practical standpoint, it would 
likely shift the costs of speculation entirely onto energy companies and could 
prove fiscally unsustainable. 
 57. Casselman, supra note 1. 
 58. In other words, “Ask me no questions, I’ll tell you no lies.” 
 59. Mims v. Hilliard, 125 So. 2d 205 (La. Ct. App. 1960). 
 60. See id. at 206. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. at 206–07. 
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asked.64 Thus, while a landowner may not have such a confidential 
relationship with an energy company or its representative that 
requires disclosure, if the landowner makes an inquiry to the 
opponent party and the facts are misrepresented, a remedy is 
available. 
Louisiana courts have not been receptive to requests by 
landowners to rescind existing contracts. Fraud and fraudulent 
inducement claims that are based simply on the premise that the 
landowners were not aware of the true value of their oil, natural gas, 
and mineral reserves appear to be hardly sufficient to sustain 
rescission of an existing contract. This is particularly important 
given the Louisiana Supreme Court’s recognition that oil, natural 
gas, and minerals do not have a readily available or fixable value 
because the values are speculative.65 These contracts are, in large 
part, speculation by companies who may or may not possess special 
knowledge. Similarly, article 1953 claims will largely fail given that 
there is no affirmative obligation on the part of the energy company 
to disclose. However, remedies are available. First, if a landowner or 
royalty owner can illustrate that the energy company or its 
representative had a special relationship that gives rise to a duty, 
then that duty might give rise to an obligation to disclose 
information regarding, for example, the value or potential value of a 
royalty. Second, if the company or its representative makes false or 
misleading statements, they are obligated to correct those incorrect 
or untrue claims. Third, and finally, it appears that the contract may 
be rescinded if the landowner makes a specific inquiry and the 
lessee made misrepresentations in response.  
III. DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE: A VIABLE REMEDY FOR LANDOWNERS 
While there were many landowners who knew that they had 
lucrative contracts and were satisfied with the terms of those leases 
or who signed below-market leases and attempted rescission, a third 
set of landowners still remains. These landowners frequently 
received offers from energy companies, or landmen working on 
behalf of energy companies, who offered terms including profitable 
above-market bonuses and royalties. Following the crash and the 
pullback in activity, companies exercised various options to evade 
                                                                                                             
 64. Id. at 207 (“While this Court is of the opinion that defendant knew of the 
formation of the unit at the time that he purchased the lease, in the absence of an 
inquiry by plaintiffs he was under no obligation to divulge same to them.”). 
 65. See Wilkins v. Nelson, 99 So. 607, 609 (La. 1924). 
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contractual obligations. Such options included failure to close,66 
failure to obtain management approval,67 and the failure to include 
lessee signature despite the presence of lessor signature.68 These 
practices have led to seemingly inconsistent decisions in federal and 
state courts across the country. The initial question is whether these 
practices are legitimate, and, if so, whether the landowner can still 
seek remedy by arguing detrimental reliance. 
A. The Requirement of a Writing and Some Manifestation of Intent 
by the Non-Signatory Party 
A conflict exists in many of the courts across the country as to 
the legitimacy of evasive tactics such as management approval 
clauses. While the specifics of practices like these vary from 
company to company, the general concept remains the same. An 
energy company approaches a landowner and offers lucrative, 
above-market bonuses and royalties to incentivize the landowner to 
sign. The landowner then signs and returns the lease. The lessee then 
takes the contract, which had a condition that required management 
approval prior to execution, and “sits” on the contract for a specified 
period of time. After the market crash, these contracts, which were 
generally not signed by the lessee, were returned to the landowners 
with a statement that they would not be entering into a lease with the 
landowners.69 While the specific determination of whether these 
practices are legitimate is a precise and fact-specific question left 
best to the discretion of trial courts, Louisiana law provides a 
general remedy against this practice.  
Under article 1839 of the Louisiana Civil Code, “[a] transfer of 
immovable property must be made by authentic act or by act under 
                                                                                                             
 66. See Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311 (5th Cir. 2012); 
see also Shafer v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-1142, 2011 WL 
677479 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2011); Valentino v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 
09-1615, 2010 WL 2034550 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2010); Hollingsworth v. Range 
Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:09CV838, 2009 WL 3601586 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 
2009). 
 67. Ballard v. XTO Energy, Inc., 784 F. Supp. 2d 635, 637 (W.D. La. 2011). 
 68. ASJ Interests v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, 11-CV-1343, 2012 WL 
2357313, at *2 (W.D. La. June 20, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-30717, 2013 WL 5977608 
(5th Cir. June 20, 2012). 
 69. For Louisiana, see generally Ballard, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 636–37; Haire v. 
XTO Energy Inc., No. 09-1214, 2009 WL 4927875 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2009). For 
other states, see generally Shafer v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 2:10-CV-
1142, 2011 WL 677479 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2011); Valentino v. Range Res.-
Appalachia, LLC, No. 09-1615, 2010 WL 2034550 (W.D. Pa. May 21, 2010); 
Hollingsworth v. Range Res.-Appalachia, LLC, No. 3:09CV838, 2009 WL 
3601586 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 28, 2009). 
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private signature.”70 Pursuant to article 1947, when no legal 
requirement is present and “the parties have contemplated a certain 
form, it is presumed that they do not intend to be bound until the 
contract is executed in that form.”71 The other end of this 
presumption is that, “unless the parties have contemplated 
otherwise, the contract need not be in a certain form.”72 
In addition, mineral leases cannot be concluded in an oral 
agreement; they must be written.73 These “management clauses” and 
other practices can be examined in light of these code articles and 
corresponding Louisiana jurisprudence. In instances where the 
energy company would receive the signature of the lessor but would 
not sign the document, the question initially became whether the 
company manifested the intent to be bound despite the presence of 
the “management clause.” 
A Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal decision addressed 
whether a mineral lease must be signed by both parties. In Bills v. 
Fruge, a mineral lease was mailed to Fruge (a prisoner) with a 
money draft attached to it.74 Bills instructed Fruge to sign the lease, 
notarize it, and then return it.75 Fruge endorsed the draft, but the 
lease was not returned.76 The trial court held that, despite the fact 
that the mineral lease was not signed, a contract existed because 
Fruge cashed the draft.77 The Third Circuit reversed, stating that 
mineral leases must be in writing.78 In making this assessment, the 
court stated that jurisprudence prior to the enactment of the Mineral 
Code consistently required mineral leases to have the “same written 
testimonial proof as transfers of immovable property.”79 Further, the 
Third Circuit indicated that scholars agreed that a written element 
was necessary.80 As a result, even though Fruge had signed the draft 
and cashed it, a written mineral lease signed by the lessor was still 
required.81 
                                                                                                             
 70. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1839 (2014). 
 71. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1947 (2014). 
 72. Patrick S. Ottinger, Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 60 LA. L. 
REV. 765, 767 (2000). 
 73. See ASJ Interests, 2012 WL 2357313, at *4; see also Ballard, 784 F. 
Supp. 2d at 638. 
 74. Bills v. Fruge, 360 So. 2d 661, 662 (La. Ct. App. 1978), writ denied, 362 
So. 2d 792 (La. 1978). 
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 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 662–63. 
 78. Id. at 663. 
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 80. See Bills, 360 So. 2d at 663. 
 81. Id. 
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However, it is also clear from Louisiana case law that both 
parties do not need to sign the written mineral lease.82 In another 
case rendered by the Third Circuit Court of Appeal, St. Romain v. 
Midas Exploration, Inc., St. Romain, a landowner, was contacted by 
Midas regarding a mineral lease, and after negotiations, an 
agreement was reached.83 Midas and its agent, French, prepared the 
mineral lease and also a bank draft for St. Romain.84 He and the 
other landowners signed the mineral lease and endorsed the bank 
draft, which was then picked up by French; however, after 30 days, 
the company did not pay the draft.85 The defendant asserted that the 
bonus payment was conditioned upon the company accepting the 
lease.86 Midas contended that, since Midas did not sign the lease, the 
company did not accept.87 The court found that a contract did exist 
because the company contacted the landowner, made the final offer, 
and prepared the lease, which manifested its consent to be bound.88 
The appellate court held that, although mineral leases must be in 
writing, it is not necessary that the lessee sign the written 
instrument; rather, the company merely must indicate its consent to 
the lease agreement.89 Since Midas prepared a bank draft and 
conducted serious negotiations, the court found that the lessee’s 
consent was present.90 Despite the absence of the lessee’s signature, 
the court found that the signature of the landowner and the 
manifestation of Midas’s intent were sufficient to support the 
existence of a binding contract.91  
This is particularly true if the energy company has prepared the 
lease agreement and presented it to the landowner for the 
landowner’s signature. The Louisiana Supreme Court made this 
                                                                                                             
 82. See Pennington v. Colonial Pipeline Co., 260 F. Supp. 643, 648 (E.D. La. 
1966), aff'd, 387 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1968) (“The oil, gas and mineral lease held by 
Pennington on the 2,425 acres of land was not a valid lease when executed by the 
purported lessor, Mills, because of the fact that it was never signed by Pennington. 
But a lease may be accepted by the lessee and thus become an effective lease by 
means other than being signed by the lessee. In this case, the lease as between 
Pennington and Mills did become an effective lease because Pennington, by 
making lease payments, and by asserting his ownership of the lease signified his 
acceptance thereof, and because the lessor Mills, in accepting rental payments 
from Pennington, is estopped to deny the validity of the lease.”) (emphasis added). 
 83. St. Romain v. Midas Exploration, Inc., 430 So. 2d 1354, 1355 (La. Ct. 
App. 1983). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 1356. 
 87. Id. at 1355–56. 
 88. Id. at 1356. 
 89. See id. at 1357. 
 90. See St. Romain, 430 So. 2d at 1357. 
 91. See id. at 1357–58. 
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conclusion in Rainey v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., where a 
contractor’s employee was injured while working at an Entergy 
site.92 The court considered the validity of a written contract 
between Entergy and the contractor that was previously prepared.93 
The contractor had signed the agreement, but Entergy had not.94 The 
Louisiana Supreme Court stated, “It has long been held by our 
courts that a party who prepares the contract and presents it to the 
other party for their signature may not later claim he is not bound by 
the contract because his signature is lacking.”95 These decisions 
form a powerful presumption that a contract is formed when the 
energy company drafts a lease agreement, receives a signature from 
the landowner, and then provides some manifestation that a contract 
exists. 
Likewise, the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, when 
applying Texas law, came to a similar conclusion by stating that a 
Chesapeake management approval clause did not preclude the 
formation of a contract: 
That the Agreement provided Chesapeake would have an 
opportunity to examine title to the leases and to review any 
contracts and agreements affecting the leases and lands 
covered by the leases, and that these needed to be 
“reasonably acceptable” to Chesapeake, also does not render 
the agreement indefinite. Texas courts have explained that 
an agreement subject to one party’s approval is not indefinite 
if it includes an objective standard—such as “reasonable”—
on which that approval must be based. . . . Thus, the 
inclusion of this clause in the agreement did not render it 
indefinite.96 
It would seem that, despite a failure to close or the presence of a 
management approval requirement, many landowners may have 
viable contracts if they were presented with a lease drafted by the 
mineral company, and they signed and returned it. Yet, many federal 
and state courts have stressed an additional requirement, namely, 
that some external manifestation of intent on the part of the 
landowner or the company is essential. 
                                                                                                             
 92. Rainey v. Entergy Gulf States, Inc., 35 So. 3d 215, 217 (La. 2010). 
 93. See id. at 218. 
 94. See id. at 217–18. 
 95. Id. at 227. 
 96. Coe v. Chesapeake Exploration, L.L.C., 695 F.3d 311, 322 n.36 (5th Cir. 
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1. Despite External Manifestations of Acceptance, If the 
Landowner Prepares the Original, then Landowner’s Signature 
Alone is Insufficient for Formation 
St. Romain and Rainey considered documents prepared by the 
company and signed by other parties; both cases also involved some 
external action demonstrating that the company desired to be bound 
by the contract.97 Some federal courts in Louisiana have stressed 
that a partially signed written lease is not sufficient if it is also 
lacking some manifestation of intent on the part of the company. In 
ASJ Interests v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, Chesapeake made an 
oral offer to ASJ, which was accepted.98 Following oral acceptance, 
the offer was reduced to writing and signed by almost all of the 
relevant landowners before Chesapeake notified its representative 
that they would not follow through with the agreement.99 ASJ 
argued that Chesapeake was bound when the plaintiffs accepted 
Chesapeake’s offer and when it was put into writing, regardless of 
whether Chesapeake signed the lease.100 
The court found that a valid lease was not formed because 
Chesapeake had not signed it, set up a closing date, or delivered the 
bonus check.101 The court noted that the proposed lease was 
modeled from a lease used in a previous interaction by ASJ.102 In a 
previous agreement over an entirely separate tract (Tract 34), the 
two parties had used a lease developed by ASJ.103 Following 
completion of that agreement, the representative for Chesapeake 
took the lease for that first separate tract (Tract 34) and updated it 
for use in the present case (Tract 33).104 The representative offered 
the exact same terms to ASJ, and all the relevant landowners orally 
agreed.105 
The district court emphasized evidence revealing that 
Chesapeake agreed to the terms, including that it prepared the lease, 
delivered the lease to ASJ, had previous negotiations that were 
successful with similar terms, and prepared checks, some of which 
                                                                                                             
 97. See Rainey, 35 So. 3d 215; St. Romain v. Midas Exploration, Inc., 430 So. 
2d 1354 (La. Ct. App. 1983). 
 98. ASJ Interests v. Chesapeake Louisiana LP, No. 11-CV-1343, 2012 WL 
2357313, at *1 (W.D. La. June 20, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-30717, 2013 WL 5977608 
(5th Cir. June 20, 2012). 
 99. Id. at *1. 
 100. Id. at *3. 
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 103. Id. at *2. 
 104. ASJ Interests, 2012 WL 2357313, at *2. 
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were mailed.106 The court stated that the presumption established in 
St. Romain and Rainey was not controlling since ASJ originally 
prepared the other lease in the first agreement: 
The Court is mindful that the party who prepares a contract 
and presents it to the other party for their signature cannot 
claim not to be bound by the contract because his signature 
is lacking. However, in the instant case, that principle is 
tempered by the fact that Madison drafted the lease 
agreement for Section 34. . . . More importantly, it was 
Madison who unilaterally added to the lease agreement a 
signature block for Chesapeake to sign. This signature block 
did not appear on any of Chesapeake’s lease forms, but 
rather was intentionally added to the Plaintiffs’ lease 
agreement by Madison himself. This act demonstrates that 
Madison, as the Plaintiffs’ representative, contemplated 
obtaining Chesapeake’s signature.107 
As a result of a failure to invoke the St. Romain and Rainey 
presumption, the federal district court concluded that—even though 
the parties might have had a meeting of the minds—a closing was 
essential to establish a binding obligation on Chesapeake.108 
Distinguishing St. Romain and Rainey, the federal court stated that, 
in this case, the lease was not complete until Chesapeake signed the 
agreement because Chesapeake did not manifest its consent by 
tendering payments, accepting the executed lease documents, or 
signing the lease when a signature block was intentionally added by 
the plaintiff.109 
While decisions similar to this may seem to narrow the 
presumption of St. Romain and Rainey, the change is merely one of 
appearance rather than substance. The question of which party 
created the contract is a fact-specific issue that requires examination 
by the trial court; however, the important part of the decision—
whether intent is objectively manifested—is largely consistent with 
St. Romain and Rainey. Distinguishing the Louisiana Third Circuit 
decision in St. Romain from the Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision 
in Rainey, the federal district court stated that the parties did not 
intend to be bound until closing and that no manifestation of intent 
existed because payments were not tendered and lease documents 
were not accepted.110 
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 110. See ASJ Interests, 2012 WL 2357313, at *6. 
2014] COMMENT 353 
 
 
 
Other recent federal district court decisions involving the 
Haynesville Shale similarly apply Louisiana law. For example, in 
Haire v. XTO Energy Inc., plaintiffs solicited an offer from the 
defendant to lease mineral rights with an attached lease form.111 The 
defendant authorized its agent to make an oral offer, which was 
accepted.112 The defendant’s agent then sent correspondence 
claiming that the representative had “gotten” the plaintiff’s tract.113 
However, they did not honor the agreement, and the plaintiff 
brought suit.114 The federal district court stated that there was no 
sign that the defendant manifested its consent; specifically, no 
serious negotiations between the parties had taken place, the 
company did not pay any drafts, and there were no other signs that 
the company desired to be bound.115 
While the form and signature of the lease were not at issue, the 
federal court, consistent with ASJ Interests, required an explicit and 
affirmative showing of some manifestation of intent.116 It now 
appears clear that, if a signature is not present, a landowner must 
seek out some affirmative act on the part of the lessee that 
demonstrates intent, such as the tendering of a bank draft,117 serious 
negotiations,118 or accepting the “executed lease documents.”119 
2. E-mail Probably Satisfies the Requirement that a Mineral 
Lease be in Writing 
Another related question is whether an e-mail exchange satisfies 
the requirement that a mineral lease be in writing. This area of law is 
almost certain to see more development, particularly given 
technological advances and Louisiana’s requirement that mineral 
leases must be written.120 In another federal district court decision 
concerning the Haynesville Shale and the manifestation of a 
company’s intent, Ballard v. XTO Energy, Inc., this question was 
                                                                                                             
 111. Haire v. XTO Energy Inc., No. 09-1214, 2009 WL 4927875, at *1 (W.D. 
La. Dec. 18, 2009). 
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 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at *2. 
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 117. See St. Romain v. Midas Exploration, Inc., 430 So. 2d 1354, 1357 (La. Ct. 
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addressed, albeit loosely.121 The district court stated that, though 
there was certainly a writing requirement, the specific “source and 
scope” of the writing requirement was unclear.122 That court 
declined to examine the issue because, even if it had constituted a 
valid mineral lease, it did not contain the other requirements; 
specifically, it did not evince offer and acceptance and did not 
preclude consummation by other means.123 As a result, no contract 
was formed.124 
However, the Louisiana Uniform Electronic Transactions Act 
clearly resolves this issue; it states that “[a] record or signature may 
not be denied legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in 
electronic form.”125 Similarly, the “contract may not be denied legal 
effect or enforceability solely because an electronic record was used 
in its formation.”126 The writing requirement has also been 
specifically satisfied because the Act states, “If a law requires a 
record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law.”127 
Finally, “[i]f a law requires a signature, an electronic signature 
satisfies the law.”128 The Fifth Circuit, when applying this Act, 
stated that there must be a showing of intent.129 This clearly resolves 
the “source and scope” concern articulated by the lower federal 
court. 
B. Even if these evasive tactics are legitimate, Louisiana landowners 
should be able to find a cause of action under detrimental reliance.  
1. Landowners’ Situations Often Satisfy the Elements of 
Detrimental Reliance 
Even if courts are willing to legitimize the evasive tactics used 
by energy companies to resist contracts following the shale boom-
and-bust, landowners should still find a remedy under Louisiana 
Civil Code article 1967. Article 1967 establishes the principles of 
detrimental reliance: 
Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself.  
                                                                                                             
 121. See generally Ballard, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 636. 
 122. Id. at 638. 
 123. Id. at 639. 
 124. Id. 
 125. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2607(A) (2005). 
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A party may be obligated by a promise when he knew or 
should have known that the promise would induce the other 
party to rely on it to his detriment and the other party was 
reasonable in so relying. Recovery may be limited to the 
expenses incurred or the damages suffered as a result of the 
promisee’s reliance on the promise. Reliance on a gratuitous 
promise made without required formalities is not 
reasonable.130 
The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that, in order to prove 
detrimental reliance, “a party must prove three elements by a 
preponderance of the evidence: (1) a representation by conduct or 
word; (2) justifiable reliance; and (3) a change in position to one’s 
detriment because of the reliance.”131 Interestingly, Louisiana Civil 
Code article 1967 and Louisiana jurisprudence do not require “a 
formal, valid, and enforceable contract.”132 As a result, it is 
inconsequential whether landowners can show the existence of a 
contract. Landowners need only show a representation, justifiable 
reliance as a result of that representation, and a change in position 
that caused a detriment. The Supreme Court stated that the purpose 
of detrimental reliance is to “prevent injustice by barring a party 
from taking a position contrary to his prior acts, admissions, 
representations, or silence.”133 
While detrimental reliance has a very long jurisprudential 
history in Louisiana, its application by Louisiana courts has been 
inconsistent.134 There are different explanations for its uneven 
application. Some contend that judges do not universally agree on 
this doctrine’s application.135 Others argue against its importation 
into Louisiana law because it is considered a foreign import.136 
The Louisiana Supreme Court in Suire v. Lafayette City-Parish 
Consolidated Government outlined the concept of detrimental 
reliance.137 In Suire, the plaintiff owned a house and some land 
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through which a channel passed—the Belle Terre Coulee.138 The 
city received a permit and attempted to improve the drainage of the 
channel.139 Plaintiff claimed that representatives of the assorted 
contractors had assured him that any damages incurred would be 
remedied.140 Later, the plaintiff noticed damage to his property.141 
The city argued that the detrimental reliance claim failed because 
there was no contract.142 However, the court astutely indicated that 
detrimental reliance is not based on the existence of contract 
because it is not tied to the party’s intent to be bound.143 More 
precisely, the court upheld the reversal of the trial court’s motion for 
summary judgment and stated that whether a representation was 
made and whether it was reasonable was an issue of material fact 
that needed to be examined.144 
However, in contrast, the federal district court in Ballard v. XTO 
Energy Inc. granted a motion for summary judgment in response to 
a claim of detrimental reliance.145 In Ballard, a landowner who 
received numerous offers to lease his land opted instead to join a 
pool of landowners to solicit an offer from XTO Energy.146 Typical 
of many of the scenarios discussed previously, serious negotiations 
were conducted, an agreement was tentatively reached, and XTO’s 
agent informed the landowners that management approval was 
required after the alleged offer.147 Soon after, plaintiffs were 
informed that management approval was denied and that there was 
no agreement.148 
Ballard is the only case that discusses detrimental reliance in the 
context of the Haynesville Shale and the evasive tactics used by 
energy companies following the market dip in Louisiana. In Ballard, 
the plaintiff alleged that he acted in reliance on XTO’s offer, and as 
a result, he rejected numerous other lucrative offers.149 This formed 
the crux of his detrimental reliance claim because he relied on the 
existence of XTO’s offer and, when XTO withdrew, other 
competitive offers were also withdrawn because of market 
conditions.150 The plaintiff was able to substantially support with 
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“ample evidence and plausibility” that he rejected other offers 
because he relied on XTO’s offer and that financial harm 
followed.151 However, the federal district court stated that 
detrimental reliance was only viable if the plaintiff’s reliance on the 
promises of XTO was reasonable, and in this case, it was not.152 The 
standard applied was whether the “plaintiff reasonably knew or 
should have known that [the] Defendant would not be bound until 
the additional proposed terms were acknowledged and a written 
contract was consummated.”153 Further, the court noted an odd 
backdrop for their decision: detrimental reliance is “relatively 
disfavored” in Louisiana due to its common law roots.154 
Ballard illustrates the dilemma of landowners who believed that 
they were parties to a valid contract and relied on that belief in either 
rejecting offers from competing firms or not actively seeking out 
bids on their land. There certainly was reliance, and there certainly 
was financial damage caused by that reliance. The question then 
becomes whether, in many of the Louisiana shale cases, there was a 
“reasonable reliance.”155 Ballard can be distinguished from 
previously discussed shale cases because the ultimate issue in 
Ballard is that the plaintiff never accepted the offer from XTO, and 
because they knowingly never accepted the contract, they could not 
reasonably rely on the assumption that there was a contract.156 
In the previous cases, however, plaintiffs reasonably believed in 
earnest that a contract had been achieved. In ASJ Interests, there was 
verbal acceptance of Chesapeake’s offer, which even the trial court 
explicitly recognized as creating “no dispute that Chesapeake had 
extended an oral offer to the Plaintiffs to lease land owned by them, 
which offer had been accepted by the Plaintiffs.”157 The 
representative for Chesapeake also said that there were checks for the 
plaintiff, which appears to be an implicit recognition that there was a 
concluded agreement.158 The representative even remarked to his 
superior that he believed that there was an agreement and that he 
“hope[d] this is just a minor delay, because these deals were made 
and accepted. . . .”159 In this case, the language of the correspondence 
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is a strong indicator that an agreement was concluded and that 
simple, non-essential formalities remained so that ASJ Interests 
would seem reasonable in relying on what the landowners believed 
was a valid agreement. Likewise, in Haire, a representative made an 
oral offer that was accepted by the plaintiffs.160 
While a mineral lease requires a written form, detrimental 
reliance does not. Detrimental reliance requires, as one of its three 
elements, only “a representation by conduct or word.”161 The 
language of the correspondent, the language of the representatives, 
and other conduct creates a scenario on which a landowner, who is 
not versed in the law, might reasonably rely. As a result, even 
though there may not be a valid mineral lease because of defects in 
the negotiation or the fact that it was not reduced to a written 
contract accompanied by manifested intent, it appears clear that a 
landowner may still have a remedy under Louisiana Civil Code 
article 1967.162 
2. Management Clauses: No Refuge from Detrimental Reliance 
Claims 
Ballard could be interpreted as a defense against detrimental 
reliance on the grounds that the existence of a management approval 
clause should cause landowners to not reasonably rely on 
agreements until final approval is obtained. However, if 
representations have been made that a deal is complete and mere 
formalities remain, or the presence of an oral agreement would seem 
to cause the landowner to reasonably presume the existence of an 
agreement, then landowners satisfy the reasonable reliance 
requirement. One case in particular that examines a management 
approval condition is Duckett v. Grambling State University, which 
contains many similarities to the shale cases.163 
In Duckett, an assistant college basketball coach in South 
Carolina left a higher paying job to move to Louisiana to coach for 
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Grambling on the assurance that he would receive a four-year 
contract.164 A promise was extended to Duckett, but it was subject to 
management approval as required by Louisiana law.165 Duckett took 
the job and worked for over a year, but he was fired because his 
contract was not considered and taken up by the board.166 Duckett 
claims that multiple representatives made assurances and, as a result, 
he quickly signed his contract and sent it to Grambling.167 
Grambling had his signed contract but he did not worry about it 
further until he later received a termination letter.168 The trial court 
stated that, while he had reasonably relied on the decision, the 
existence of a management approval clause (formal acceptable by a 
higher school authority) prohibited him from being able to 
reasonably rely on presumed existence of a contract because he 
knew that it was a prerequisite.169 The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals reversed, however, stating that there were material issues of 
fact that would require a trial on the merits.170 
Duckett indicates that at least some Louisiana courts would 
resist the argument that the management approval requirement in 
shale cases operates as an automatic bar for detrimental reliance 
claims. Presumably, this would allow landowners to reasonably rely 
on the existence of agreements despite the presence of such a clause. 
If landowners can show a reasonable reliance on representations of 
the company-lessee, they may be able to find a remedy under 
detrimental reliance.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
In the aftermath of the shale bust and the energy company “land-
grab,” many landowners are left with mixed consequences. Some 
landowners possess undervalued contracts, relative to the potential 
value of the land. Landowners’ claims of fraud or fraudulent 
inducement by energy companies and their representatives have 
fallen—and will continue to fall—on deaf ears in Louisiana courts. 
The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated rather explicitly that 
extraction of oil, natural gas, and mineral deposits are an inherently 
speculative activity with no fixed value.171 The Louisiana courts 
have stated that Louisiana law does not establish a duty on the part 
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of the energy company to disclose the value of those resources. 
Further, it appears that in the absence of a misrepresentation by the 
energy company, there will not be a duty to disclose. 
Landowners who relied on the belief that they had a viable 
contract, but later found out that the company was attempting to 
back out of their agreement, also face significant hurdles, but some 
options are available. If the agreements have been reduced to writing 
and include the lessor’s signature, there might be a remedy if the 
energy company has manifested its intent to be bound by the 
agreement. Regardless, even if no contract exists, there is a viable 
and under-utilized area of Louisiana law that offers a remedy for 
these beleaguered landowners: detrimental reliance. If landowners 
can show that they reasonably relied on representations of the 
energy company and its agents that resulted in a detriment, then, 
even in the absence of a written agreement, landowners can receive 
the compensation they desire and deserve. 
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